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We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation.     
We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear 
wage taxes.  We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when 
individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax 
morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government 
maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of 
public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal 
degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of 
the individuals' tax morality. 
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A tanulmányban az adómorál hatását elemezzük a társadalmilag optimális progresszív 
személyi jövedelemadó-rendszerre. Feltesszük, hogy a mindenkinek egyformán járó 
alapjáradékot és a közkiadást lineáris béradó fedezi. A bevallott kereseteket egyéni 
hasznosságmaximalizálásból származtatjuk, amikor a dolgozók – adómoráljuktól 
függően – némi kielégülést nyernek keresetük bevallásából, és nem zárhatók ki a 
közjavak fogyasztásából. A kormányzat utilitarista társadalmi jóléti függvényt 
maximalizál, amely figyelembe veszi a közkiadásból fakadó egyéni hasznosságokat is. 
Számpéldán igazoljuk, hogy a társadalmilag optimális újraelosztás foka és a 
közkiadások szintje az egyének adómoráljának egyaránt növekvő függvénye. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak:  adómorál, keresetbevallás, progresszív jövedelemadó, jóléti 
gazdaságtan 
 











In the last decades, tax and social contribution rates have increased in most of the
developed countries, and as a result, the size of the hidden (or equivalently, shadow)
economy has also risen (e.g. Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984; Schneider and Enste,
2000). The most popular expression of this connection is the so-called La®er-curve,
depicting the dependence of total tax revenues on marginal tax rates. In addition, Frey
and Weck-Hannemann (1984) introduced a parameter \tax morality", which may have
a quantitatively larger and statistically stronger in°uence on the tax revenue than the
direct tax share has (cf. also Friedman et al., 2000). Even if one cannot measure tax
morality, it is obvious that di®erent countries with the same total tax share may have
characteristically di®erent sizes of the hidden economy. It is enough to look at Table
10 of Schneider (2002, p. 29) and discover that in 1996, in terms of the GDP, Greece
and Austria had a total tax and social security burden about 70%, while the sizes of
the shadow economies were 28.5% and 8.3%, respectively. Similar phenomena can be
observed in transition (Schneider, 2002 and Lack¶ o, 2007) and other countries.
To change the income distribution, one part of the tax revenue is paid back to the
individuals. The other part, called the net tax is the di®erence between gross tax and
cash-back, it ¯nances public services. We speak of a progressive tax system if the ratio
of net tax to reported wage is a decreasing function of the reported wage. In the present
paper we construct a very simple model to study the interrelation between tax morality
and progressive income (wage) taxation. The main message of the paper is as follows:
for any level of tax morality, there exists a socially optimal wage-tax system, the size
and progressivity of which grow with the tax morality.
Mirrlees (1971) was the ¯rst to study a market economy, where the labor supply is
a decreasing function of the net wage and the government maximizes the social wel-
fare under incentive constraints. To simplify the model, Sheshinski (1972) (see also
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) con¯ned the welfare discussion to linear tax functions. He
summarized his main result as follows: \...the optimal marginal tax rate is bounded
by a fraction that decreases with the minimum elasticity of labor supply". Represent-
ing a progressive system as an inhomogeneous linear function with a negative incept
(cash-back) can be a good approximation and becoming quite popular in transition
economies by now. Nevertheless, the introduction of tax credits diminishes the burden
of a negative income tax (cf. Akerlof, 1978). A third dimension of taxation was modeled
by Varian (1980): social insurance against sickness or unemployment. Among the ¯rst
modelers, Romer (1975) obtained interesting results concerning the majority voting on
linear income tax|an alternative to welfare analysis.
Studying the e®ects of the Russian °at tax reform of 2001, Gorodnichenko et al.
1(2009, p. 505), concluded that \(i) the tax evasion response to the tax change was
large, but that (ii) the productivity response was relatively weak ...." Relying on this
type of observations, the present paper models underreporting rather than restrained
labor supply. As a technical simpli¯cation, we assume full employment. Following
the methodology of neoclassical economics, we derive the reported (declared) wages
from individual utility maximization, where the individual ¯nds certain satisfaction in
partially reporting wages, while free-rides on public goods and services. Note that here
an individual only reports his wages to increase his resulting moral satisfaction. (In
reality, the employer also in°uences this decision but we neglect this complication!) We
call the reader's attention to a special feature of our formulation: though with rising
marginal tax rate, the reported wage decreases, it does not disappear even at a 100
percent. As a result, the tax revenue may increase with the marginal tax rate in the
entire interval! This result is in harmony with that of Malcomson (1986) with an entirely
di®erent approach.
While one part of the taxes serves income redistribution, another part ¯nances public
goods, to be used freely by everybody (or alternatively, assume a balanced tax system,
where public goods are paid from individual incomes). Note that the health contri-
butions can be considered as taxes because there is no strong relation between the
individual tax and the resulting public health services. But the issue of unemployment
or pension contributions and bene¯ts needs a separate treatment (Baumann, 2009 and
Simonovits, 2009, respectively), especially for countries with wage-related bene¯ts. Of
course, there are a lot of studies modeling the impact of redistribution on the labor
supply in an overlapping generations model, incorporating a pension system (see the
References in Simonovits, 2009).
In our model, the government has a utilitarian social welfare function, i.e. the ex-
pected value of the individual utility functions (with due respect to public goods and
services). The parameter values of the socially optimal tax system are obtained from
social welfare maximization. Following others, we also add another idealization to the
model: there is only a wage tax but no value added tax (for the di®erence between
income and value added taxes under tax evasion, see Richter and Boadway, 2005). We
investigate the impact of the size and of the structure of the tax system on the reported
wages of individuals with heterogeneous wages and tax moralities in a general equilib-
rium framework. We also assume that the individuals fully understand the mechanism
of the system and the government determines its tax policy as a benevolent dictator.
The major conjecture of the present paper|an analog to Sheshinski's result cited
above|is as follows: The higher the tax morality, the higher are the socially optimal
marginal tax rate and|above a certain critical morality value|the cash-back. In the
limiting case, when the individuals report their full wages (white economy), and the
labor supply is still exogenously given, it is worthwhile to introduce a fully redistributive
wage tax, equalizing individual consumption volumes (like in a kibbutz).
Having outlined the general model, we analyze the issue with a simple example,
where the utility functions are logarithmic (though the utility function of underreporting
also contains a linear term). Even then we were only able to derive the conditional
individual decisions, without solving the general equilibrium problem in a closed form.
The only exception is the white economy, where even the socially optimal tax parameter
values can analytically be determined.
2When we turn on the computer, and ¯ll the model with illustrative numbers, we are
able to consider the balance conditions, too. The most important illustrative results
are contained in Table 6: as the common tax morality rises, both the size and the
progressivity of the socially optimal tax system increase.
The technical problems of modeling required utmost simpli¯cations. We hope that
notwithstanding its abstractness, our toy model contributes to the better understanding
of the interaction among reporting of wages, taxation and the public services. Anyway,
we must consider the conclusions with utmost care.
Having presented the model, now we outline the related literature. The classical
paper of tax evasion is Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which determined the optimal
reported wage under given wage, marginal tax rate, audit probability and ¯ne. Pestieau
and Possen (1991) modeled the connection between tax evasion behavior and the choice
of work place, anticipating a most serious problem of any transition economy. Feldstein
(1999) and Chetty (2009) analyzed tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income
tax, including underreported incomes into the generalized labor supply.
Turning from °exible labor supply to reporting wages, Vald¶ es-Prieto (2009) analyzed
a model, including a pension sector, where individuals choose the density of contribution,
i.e. \the proportion of active life worked in fully covered jobs (density) rather than hours
worked." Instead of diminishing the individual's utility as underreporting does in our
model, he explicitly modeled the lower productivity achieved in the informal sector and
compared the e±ciency of various insurance systems, including pension credit.
In their survey, Andreoni et al. (1998) extended the narrow neoclassical model and
introduced soft but relevant concepts like moral sentiments and the satisfaction of the
taxpayer with public goods and services. From our point of view, they made three
important claims: (i) the morally more sensitive citizens declare a higher share of their
true wages; (ii) the more unfair the tax system is in the eyes of the citizens, the less
wage they declare; (iii) the less satis¯ed the taxpayers are with the public goods and
services, the less wage they declare. In a related study, Lack¶ o (2007) demonstrated that
the tax morality is closely related to the citizens' opinion of the utility of public goods
and services.
Christie and Holzner (2006) considered both old and new EU members and obtained
interesting estimates on the degree of tax evasion. For example, according to their Table
1.19, in Hungary, 2002, individuals reported 69.8 percent of their personal income tax
base. In contrast, their Table 1.10 contains a pair 76.6 percents on the Czech Republic,
2003. Similarly, Janky (2007) considered the public attitudes toward tax evasion in
Hungary and he cited remarkable data from CEORG Omnibus survey 1999 (Table 2).
To the question \Is it improper for a tax-payer to provide a false income statement in
order to avoid taxes?", 53% of the Hungarians and 77% of the Czechs answered with
disapproval, while 42% of the Hungarians and 18% of the Czechs found it excusable.
Bakos et al. (2008) discussed the tax evasion behavior of the Hungarian employees,
using the reactions to the Hungarian tax reform of 2005.
OECD (2002) gave a wide survey on the `non-observed' economy. For a comparative
analysis of the hidden economies of transition countries, see also Lack¶ o (2000). Tonin
(2007) and Elek et al. (2009) discussed the related interaction of minimum wage and
tax evasion.
We outline the structure of the present paper. Section 2 develops the model and then
3Section 3 presents some analytical results. Sections 4 displays numerical illustrations
and Section 5 concludes. An Appendix proves the corollaries.
2. The model
This section starts with the determination of that reported wage which maximizes the
utility function of a given individual. Then we outline the macro framework and the
social welfare function to be maximized by the government.
Utility maximization
In a given period of time, say in a year, an individual earns wage w > 0 and ¯les in a
report v on this wage, v 2 [0;w]. He pays a linear wage tax µv with a marginal tax rate
µ , 0 < µ < 1 and receives a lump-sum return, i.e. cash-back " ¸ 0. The individual's
net tax is a = µv ¡ ". (This is the simplest formulation of progressive wage taxation.)
The average net tax ¯nances public goods and services including health care.
The individual's consumption is given by
c = w ¡ µv + ":
Anticipating the macro framework below, we de¯ne the net average tax by
¹ a = µ¹ v ¡ " > 0;
where ¹ v denotes the average reported wage (see below). If one does not want to consider
public goods, (s)he can get rid of it by adding a balance condition, namely ¹ a = 0 or
equivalently, " = µ¹ v.
In the present model, every individual has two characteristics, namely his wage w
and his tax morality p. The subjective utility function consists of three parts: (i) the
individual's utility u(c), (ii) the utility of reporting wage v when one earns w and has
a tax morality p: z(w;p;v) and (iii) the utility of the public good q(¹ a) ¯nanced by the
average net tax ¹ a. (The second term corresponds to the moral sentiments in Andreoni
et al. (1998) plus the utility loss due to the cost of underreporting in Feldstein (1999).)
In sum,
^ U(w;p;c;v) = u(c) + z(w;p;v) + q(¹ a):
(The hat distinguishes this function from the one to be used below.) As is usual, u(¢),
z(w;p;¢) and q(¢) are smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave functions in the
feasibility intervals. In addition, the usual properties are assumed:
u0(0) = 1; u0(1) = 0; z0
v(w;p;0) = 1; z0
v(w;p;w) = 0; q0(0) = 1; q0(1) = 0:
As a detour, we mention that in the classical case of °exible labor supply, where l
stands for the labor supply, consumption is c = (1¡µ)wl+" and the utility of reporting
is replaced by labor disutility z(l).
By de¯nition, the individual determines his reported wage v(w;p) so as to maxi-
mize the subjective utility ^ U(w;p;c;v). By substituting the consumption equation into
^ U(w;p;c;v) and replacing the hat by tilde, results in another form of the utility function:
~ U(w;p;v) = u(w ¡ µv + ") + z(w;p;v) + q(¹ a):
Neglecting the individually uncontrollable third term, partial derivation by v yields the
individual optimum:
4Theorem 1. Under the above assumptions, the individually optimal reported wage
v(w;p) lies in the interval (0;w) and satis¯es
¡µu0(w ¡ µv + ") + z0
v(w;p;v) = 0:
Note two simple consequences: (i) If there is no tax, then people report their full
wages: for µ = 0 = ", v = w holds. (ii) Even for a 100 percent marginal tax rate, people
report some wage: for µ = 1, v > 0 holds.
To make the optimal reported wage increasing with the tax morality, wage and cash
back but decreasing with marginal tax rate, we need additional technical assumptions
on the utility to report function:
z00
vw(w;p;v) > 0; z00
vp(w;p;v) > 0; z00
vv(w;p;v) < 0:
Corollary 1. Under our additional assumptions, the optimal reported wage is an
increasing function of the tax morality, wage and cash back but is a decreasing function
of the marginal tax rate:
v0(p) > 0; v0(w) > 0; v0(") > 0; v0(µ) < 0:
The proof is relegated to an appendix.
Macro framework
Until now we have only considered a single, though arbitrary individual. In reality,
there exists a lot of types, with a 2-dimensional probability distribution function F:
F(W; P) = P(w < W; p < P), where w and p are the random variables of wage and
tax morality, respectively and P is the probability operator.
It is time to de¯ne the average reported wages:
¹ v = Ev;
where E is the expectation operator. The optimal v depends on the government tax
parameters µ and " and so does ¹ v. Finally, let T be the per-capita total tax revenues:
T = µ¹ v = ¹ a + ". Note that the requirement of positive net average tax is equivalent to
T > ", which limits the redistribution.
As has been mentioned in the Introduction, since the advent of supply-side economics
around 1980, the La®er-curve, the per capita tax revenue{marginal tax rate schedule
T(µ), has been enjoying a central role in public ¯nance. Theorem 1 implies that the
individual reported wage is a decreasing function of the marginal tax rate, hence the
same is true for the average reported wage. It is clear that T(0) = 0 and T0(0) ¸ 0. Since
T(µ) is continuous in the interval [0;1], there is a marginal tax rate µL which maximizes
the tax revenues. If that marginal tax rate is low, then the scope of redistribution and
public expenditure is limited. Because of ¹ v(1) > 0, it may occur (see Corollary 2 below),
however, that T(µ) is increasing all over the interval [0;1], yielding a global maximum
per capita tax at µL = 1, i.e. T(1) = ¹ v(1).
5At this point, we de¯ne the minimal tax morality, as the common value of individual
tax moralities yielding zero net tax rate. In formula: pm is the solution to the equation
µ¹ v(p;µ;") = " for any given pair (µ;"), with µ > ". Such a number exists because
¹ v(¢;µ;") is an increasing function, ¹ v(0;µ;") = 0 and ¹ v(1;µ;") = 1, hence µ¹ v(p;µ;") ¡ "
satis¯es the conditions of Bolzano's theorem.
From now on we always assume implicitly that the tax system is consistent with tax
morality, i.e. the tax morality is higher than the minimal value: p > p > pm. This
notion can be extended to heterogeneous tax moralities but we skip it.
We conjecture that the higher is µ or ", the higher is pm.
Finally, we outline the government's welfare maximizing task. The utilitarian social
welfare function is de¯ned as the average of the objective utilities taken at the subjective
optima (starred) U(c¤;v¤;¹ a¤):
V (µ;") = EU(c¤;v¤;¹ a¤) = Eu(c¤) + Ez(v¤) + q(¹ a¤):
The government looks for a pair (µ;") such that maximizes the social welfare function.
Theorem 2. The government's interior optimum satis¯es the following ¯rst-order
necessary conditions:
0 = V 0
µ(µ;") = E[¡u0(c¤)v¤ + z0
v(w;p;v¤)v0
µ + q0(¹ a¤)(¹ v¤ + µ¹ v0
µ)]
and
0 = V 0
"(µ;") = E[u0(c¤) + z0
v(w;p;v¤)v0
" + q0(¹ a¤)(µ¹ v0
" ¡ 1)]:
Proof. By elementary calculus,




µ] + q0(¹ a¤)¹ a0
µ
and




"] + q0(¹ a¤)¹ a0
":
Using the facts that c0
µ = ¡v¤ and c0
" = 1, ¹ a0
µ = ¹ v¤ + µ¹ v0
µ and ¹ a0
" = µ¹ v0
" ¡ 1, these
conditions simplify to Theorem 2.
It is not enough to determine the socially optimal tax system, it is worth studying
the welfare implications of deviating from it. A standard procedure is to de¯ne the
social welfare V (!;µ;") as a function of tax system (µ;") and a uniform multiplying of
wages by a common factor !. Then the ine±ciency of using a tax system (µ;") rather
than the socially optimal (µo;"o) can be de¯ned by
V (1;µ;") = V (!;µo;"o)
where ! · 1.
Note that Theorem 2 is quite cumbersome and at least at this stage of research, it
seems to be suitable to simplify the discussion by invoking simple utility functions and
other simplifying assumptions.
63. Analytical results
In this Section we consider simple cases which can be studied analytically: logarithmic
utility functions and white economy.
Logarithmic utility functions
Following several studies, we use logarithmic speci¯cation, although it eliminates certain
subtler relations arising with CRRA. In order to exclude the anomaly that any individual
can increase his subjective utility by overreporting his true wage, a linear term had to
be added to the logarithmic function z(w;p;¢). Here are the parametric functions:
u(c) = logc; z(w;p;v) = p(logv ¡ v=w); q(¹ a) = ·log¹ a;
where p > 0 is the parameter of the tax morality, a key parameter of the present model
and · ¸ 0 is the parameter of the e±ciency of public goods and services. If · = 0
(or minimal tax morality), we obtain the economy without public services, where the
socially optimal net average tax is zero: µ¹ v = ". Note that u0(c) = 1=c, z0
v(w;p;v) =
p(1=v ¡ 1=w). In the interval 0 < v · w,
z00
vw(w;p;v) = p=w2 > 0; z00
vp(w;p;v) = 1=v ¡ 1=w > 0; z00
vv(w;p;v) = p=v2 < 0;
as the additional assumptions require. Also q0(¹ a) = ·=¹ a ¸ 0.







A = pµ; B = µw + p(µw + w + "); C = pw(w + "):
Proof. The optimality condition of Theorem 1 reduces to
Z(v) =
¡µ










Since Z(0) = 1, Z(w) < 0 and Z(1) > 0, there exists a unique root v¤ 2 (0;w) to
Z = 0. (The other root lies to the right of w.) Since Z = 0 can be transformed into a
quadratic equation
Av2 ¡ Bv + C = 0
with coe±cients above, we have a closed-form expression for v¤.
We present two corollaries to Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. For the proportional taxation (" = 0), the La®er-curve T(µ) is an
increasing function of the marginal tax rate µ.





; µ > ":
The proofs are relegated to an appendix.
White economy
Before giving up analytical hopes, it is worthwhile considering the limiting case of white
economy, where every individual reports his full wage. We discuss ¯rst in general:
v = w, then for the logarithmic case: p = 1.
In the general case, the formula for consumption simpli¯es to
c = (1 ¡ µ)w + ":
The relation ¹ v = ¹ w = 1 makes the La®er-curve and equation for the net average tax
rather trivial: T(µ) = µ and ¹ a = µ ¡ " or " = µ ¡ ¹ a. The social welfare function is now
V (µ;¹ a) = Eu((1 ¡ µ)w + µ ¡ ¹ a) + q(¹ a):
Theorem 4. In a white economy, the socially optimal tax system redistributes
everything:
µo = 1 and " = 1 ¡ ¹ ao = co;
where the optimal net tax rate is determined by
u0(1 ¡ ¹ ao) = q0(¹ ao):
Proof. To determine the social optimum note that by Jensen's inequality,
Eu((1 ¡ µ)w + µ ¡ ¹ a) · u(1 ¡ ¹ a):
The upper bound on the social welfare function|which is sharp for uniform wages or
µ = 1|simpli¯es to
V [¹ a] = u(1 ¡ ¹ a) + q(¹ a); i:e: V (µ;¹ a) · V [¹ a]:
Taking the partial derivative with respect to ¹ a, results in
V 0[¹ a] = ¡u0(1 ¡ ¹ a) + q0(¹ a) = 0:
By our assumptions, there exists a unique solution, ¹ ao. If wages are uniform, then the
social optimum is indeterminate, only the net tax rate is determinate. In the relevant
case of heterogeneous wages, however, the optimal marginal tax rate µo is equal to 1,
implying c¤ = " = 1 ¡ ¹ ao for any type.
The economic content is clear: the higher the economic e±ciency · of public services,
the lower is the share of (private) consumption of the total output.






As is usual, we shall call economies grey, where only part of the wage is reported. The
lower the ratio of average reported wage to average wage, i.e. ¹ v, the grayer (the darker)
the economy is. Corollary 1 implies that for ¯xed tax parameter values, ¹ v(p) is an
increasing function, i.e. the economy gets less grey as the tax morality rises. We add
Conjecture 1. Consider an economy with a uniform tax morality p and heteroge-
neous wages. There is a critical morality value p¤ with the following property. With
the rise of tax morality p, the socially optimal marginal tax rate µ(p) rises together
with the average reported wage ¹ v¤(p) and the optimal cash-back "(p) is zero for p · p¤
and increasing otherwise. In the limit, µ(1) = 1 and "(1) = 1=(1 + ·) together with
¹ v¤(1) = 1.
4. Numerical illustrations
We continue our investigation by numerical illustrations. First consider the white econ-
omy. After some experimentation, we have chosen · = 1=3 for the utility coe±cient of
the public services. This choice renders the results for the white economy (Theorem 4)
reasonable, the socially optimal consumption is "o = 3=4 = c¤ with ¹ a¤ = 1=4.
Next we move to the grey economy with various shades, represented by p. To begin
with, we are studying the quantitative impact of tax morality parameter p on individual
behavior in a proportional tax system with " = 0. We have already shown that in the
white economy, the socially optimal marginal tax rate is µo = ·=(1 + ·) = 0:25. What
is surprising is that this relation approximately remains valid for the grey economies
with various shades!
Table 1 illustrates the quantitative form of Corollary 1: as the value of the tax
morality rises, the reported wage increases, the individual consumption decreases. To
display the white economy, we present the solution for p = 1, in the last row of Table
1.
9Table 1. Impact of tax morality with proportional taxes: w = 1
Tax Reported Net
morality wage Consumption tax
p v(P) c(P) a(P)
0.5 0.628 0.843 0.157
1.0 0.764 0.809 0.191
1.5 0.826 0.793 0.207
2.0 0.863 0.784 0.216
3.0 0.903 0.774 0.226
5.0 0.939 0.765 0.235
1 1 0.750 0.250
Remark: µ = 0:25 and " = 0
To study the impact of progressivity, we choose " = 0:15 and raise the marginal tax
rate to µ = 0:3. Table 2 displays the results. Because of the lower net tax rate µ ¡ ",
consumption becomes higher and public expenditure becomes lower in the limit than in
Table 1. We start now with p = 0:3, the minimal tax morality of Corollary 3.
Table 2. Impact of tax morality with progressive taxes: w = 1
Tax Reported Net
morality wage Consumption tax
p v¤ c a
0.3 0.500 1 0
0.5 0.617 0.965 0.035
1.0 0.755 0.924 0.076
1.5 0.819 0.904 0.096
2.0 0.856 0.893 0.107
3.0 0.898 0.881 0.119
5.0 0.935 0.869 0.131
1 1 0.850 0.150
Remark: µ = 0:3 and " = 0:15
Next we present a generalization of Corollary 2 for a progressive tax system, already
discussed in Table 2. We pick up three di®erent morality values: p = 0:5, 2 and 5 and
vary the marginal tax rate. Note that too low µs and ps result in ¹ a < 0, then we write
{ in the corresponding entry of Table 3. Indeed, the second and third La®er-curves are
increasing in the interval [0:2;1], and the ¯rst one in [0:3;1].
10Table 3. La®er-curves with progressive tax and various moralities
Marginal T a x r e v e n u e
tax rate for p = 0:5 for p = 2 for p = 5
µ T0:5 T2 T5
0.2 { 0.181 0.192
0.3 0.185 0.257 0.281
0.4 0.216 0.322 0.363
0.5 0.238 0.378 0.438
0.6 0.256 0.424 0.506
0.7 0.270 0.464 0.565
0.8 0.281 0.496 0.616
0.9 0.291 0.524 0.659
1.0 0.299 0.547 0.695
Remark: " = 0:15
In Tables 1{3, we assumed perfect homogeneity. Next we introduce heterogeneous
tax moralities, where we choose two values: pL = 0:5 and pH = 2 with relative frequen-
cies fL and fH = 1¡fL, respectively. As can be expected, as the share of low reporters
decreases, the average reported wage and the net tax increase, while the consumption
drops.
Table 4. The impact of the frequency of low reporters
A v e r a g e
Frequency reported net
of L wage consumption tax
fL ¹ v ¹ c ¹ a
1.0 0.617 0.965 0.035
0.8 0.665 0.951 0.049
0.6 0.712 0.936 0.064
0.4 0.760 0.922 0.078
0.2 0.808 0.908 0.092
0.0 0.856 0.893 0.107
Remark: µ = 0:3 and " = 0:15, pL = 0:5 and pH = 2.
Until now we assumed identical wages. In the further calculations, we shall arbi-
trarily apply a very simple wage distribution: (wL;wH) with fH = 1=3 and fL = 2=3.
To enhance its impact, we have chosen a rather extreme distribution with wL = 0:5
and wH = 2, yielding a unitary average wage. To simplify the exposition, we return to
homogeneous tax morality, p.
Considering heterogeneous wages, we ¯rst display the numerical value of minimal
tax morality, yielding close to zero net tax rate. We select a series of tax parameter
values, which in turn are proportional to the absolute social optimum: µ¤ = 1 and
11"¤ = 3=4, i.e. " = 3µ=4, 0 · µ · 1. We shall see that the closer the tax system to
the absolute optimum, the higher is the minimal value of tax morality, pm. (cf. Table
4). In words: higher taxes require higher tax morality. Furthermore, the stronger the
taxation, the higher are the lower-paid's reported wage and consumption and the lower
are the higher-paid's reported wage and consumption! If wages were the same, then
pm = 3µ would hold; but wages are di®erent, therefore the actual pm is higher.
Table 5. Minimal tax morality as a function of the tax system
Marginal Cash- Minimal Reported
tax rate back tax morality Wage wage Consumption










Remark: wL = 0:5 and wH = 2.
Next we display the dependence of socially optimal tax parameters on the tax moral-
ity. Because this dependence is very weak, we rest satis¯ed with rounded-o® values. We
select four values of tax morality: p = 0:5; 2; 5 and 1. With rising tax morality, the
socially optimal marginal tax rate µ(p) rises until it reaches its maximum, 1. The cash-
back "(p) also rises from p¤ ¼ 0:5, namely to 0.75, in harmony with our Conjecture 1.
The reported wages and the public expenditures grow in parallel!
12Table 6. Socially optimal tax system|the tax morality
O p t i m a l
Tax marginal cash- Reported Consump- Net
morality tax rate back Wage wage tion tax
p µ " w v c ¹ a
0.5 0.25 0.0 0.157
0.5 0.314 0.422
2.0 1.255 1.686
2 0.5 0.2 0.181
0.5 0.400 0.500
2.0 1.489 1.456
5 0.75 0.4 0.221
0.5 0.442 0.569
2.0 1.600 1.200
1 1 0.75 0.25
0.5 0.5 0.75
2.0 2.0 0.75
Remark: wL = 0:5 and wH = 2.
To evaluate the e±ciency loss of using a suboptimal tax system, we compare the taxes
that are socially optimal in a dark/light grey economy in a light/dark grey economy,
respectively. Here are the results: !0:5j2 = 0:905 and !2j0:5 = 0:987. That is, using a
tax system which is optimal at p = 2 in a dark economy (p = 0:5) yields an e±ciency
loss of 9.5%, while using a tax system which is optimal at p = 0:5 in a light economy
(p = 2) yields an e±ciency loss of 1.3%. These numbers are probably too small and
indicate a misspeci¯cation of our utility formulas.
Finally, we check the sensitivity of our results by reducing the inequality of the
wages, with wL = 0:75 rather than 0.5, i.e. wH = 1:5 rather than 2. It is to be expected
that in the lighter grey economies, the weaker the wage inequality, the lower are the
socially optimal marginal tax rate and the cash-back but its extent is still surprising.
Now the critical parameter p¤ is around 2 rather than 0.5 and we had to raise the tax
morality to 10 to obtain observable cash-back, arising already at p = 2 with a stronger
wage inequality!
13Table 7. Socially optimal tax system|tax morality, weak wage inequality
O p t i m a l
Tax marginal cash- Reported Consump- Net
morality tax rate back Wage wage tion tax
p µ " w v c ¹ a
0.5 0.25 0 0.157
0.75 0.471 0.632
1.50 0.942 1.265
10 0.45 0.2 0.225
0.75 0.712 0.630
1.50 1.411 1.065
Remark: wL = 0:75 and wH = 1:5.
5. Conclusions
We have constructed a model, in which|re°ecting mainly the characteristics of tran-
sitional and developing countries|the size and the progressivity of the tax system in-
°uence the reported wages rather than the labor supply. We have just made the ¯rst
theoretical and numerical computations. The results are promising but a lot of further
analytical investigations and numerical trials are needed to corroborate the temporary
conclusions: the introduction of a signi¯cant cash-back crowds out the public services,
especially in economies with low tax morality.
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Appendix
The proof of Corollary 1. To prove the inequalities, we take the total derivative
of both sides of
µu0(w ¡ µv + ") = z0
v(w;p;v)
with respect the foregoing variables or parameters.
(i) With respect to w:





vw = [µ2u00(c) + z00
vv]v0(w):
14Since u00(c) < 0, z00
vw > 0 and z00
vv < 0, v0(w) > 0.








yielding v0(p) > 0.
(iii) With respect to ":
µu00(c)[1 ¡ µv0(")] = z00
vvv0(")
or expressing v0("):
µu00(c) = [µu00(c) + z00
vv]v0(")
implying v0(") > 0.
(iv) With respect to µ:
u0(c) + µu00(c)[¡v ¡ µv0(µ)] = z00
vvv0(µ)
or expressing v0(µ):
u0(c) ¡ µu00(c)v = [µ2u00(c) + z00
vv]v0(µ);
hence v0(µ) < 0.
The proof of Corollary 2. From Theorem 3,
T(µ) =
p + (1 + p)µ ¡
p
(1 + p)2µ2 + 2p(1 ¡ p)µ + p2
2p
:
To demonstrate T0(µ) ¸ 0, we can drop the constant denominator, and show that the
numerator's derivative is nonnegative:
1 + p ¡
2(1 + p)2µ + 2p(1 ¡ p)
2
p
(1 + p)2µ2 + 2p(1 ¡ p)µ + p2 ¸ 0:
Rearranging,
(1 + p)2[(1 + p)2µ2 + 2p(1 ¡ p)µ + p2] ¸ [(1 + p)2µ + p(1 ¡ p)]2
= (1 + p)4µ2 + 2(1 + p)2µp(1 ¡ p) + p2(1 ¡ p)2:
With simple algebra, the last inequality is established.
The proof of Corollary 3. For homogeneous wage and the minimal tax morality,
¹ v = v = "=µ. Substituting this value and A;B;C into Av2 ¡ Bv + C = 0 yields
pmµ
"2
µ2 ¡ [µ + p(µ + 1 + ")]
"
µ
+ pm(1 + ") = 0:
Simple algebra yields pm.
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